


1918—



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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## DEMobilIZATION PROTESTS RAISE QUESTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

PROTEST demonstrations by American troops in such widely separated areas as the Philippines, Guam, Japan, China, India, Germany and France have raised some crucial questions about the nature of our foreign policy and its understanding by the public. It would be easy to interpret these demonstrations, and the parallel home-front sentiment for demobilization, as merely reflecting the natural desire of the nation to return completely to civilian life now that the enemy's forces have been beaten. Or to attribute recent events to the fact that many soldiers and civilians question the methods actually followed in demobilization. But there is more to the situation than this, for it is evident that an important section of the American people either does not understand the aims of American policy abroad, distrusts those aims as reflected in particular areas, or is not sure that clear aims exist. Consequently, the present period of readjusting our policies on demobilization might well be used to consider anew how the public and the government can be brought into a larger measure of agreement on the nature of America's commitments abroad.

**DO WE NEED TROOPS OVERSEAS?** It is difficult to say whether a majority of the American people are opposed in principle to the presence of American troops abroad in peacetime. But the country unquestionably expects to be shown why troops are actually necessary in any specific area in which the government desires to keep them. Perhaps the simplest approach to the problem, then, is to recognize that there are only two territories in which such a necessity exists on a significant scale, namely Germany and Japan. For if we are to avert a third world war and make certain that the military defeat of the Nazis and Japanese militarists is followed by a change in the national mentality of the German and

Japanese peoples, it will clearly be essential to maintain American troops in both countries for a considerable period. It is unfortunate in the highest degree that recent demonstrations in Berlin and Tokyo have given the forces of the old order in both areas reason to hope that the occupation is foredoomed to failure and that a resurgence of military power may be possible at a later date.

There has never been any lack of sound and persuasive arguments to present to the public and armed forces in explaining why an extended occupation of Germany and Japan is important. In the eight months since the defeat of Germany and the five months since Japan surrendered there have been innumerable opportunities for the White House and State Department to drive the point home. But there is no evidence that American forces in the former enemy countries have received anything that could properly be called "orientation" on this subject, or that the people at home have had the matter presented to them. On the contrary, there has been a striking absence of leadership from those who are in positions of authority. It is true, of course, that political risks are involved in telling the public that troops are required to prevent Germany and Japan from again becoming military threats, but it is the function of leaders to assume such risks if the objective is sound.

The record shows that not long after the defeat of Germany the military government of the American zone became increasingly hampered by the withdrawal of high-point men who knew their occupation jobs, and by the shortage as well as the inadequacy of replacements. Most striking, however, were the statements made by high military chiefs in connection with Japan. On September 15, when our troops had been in Japan two weeks, Lieutenant Gen-

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eral Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the occupying Eighth Army, declared: "If the Japs continue acting as they are now, within a year this thing should be washed up." Soon afterward, while not taking the position that the occupation would be short, General MacArthur forecast the probability of a sharp cut in the occupation forces within six months and their replacement by regular Army men.

These statements inevitably encouraged a general expectation that our troops would soon return from Japan and also had repercussions among the forces in Germany. In fact, one of the significant aspects of the recent demonstrations is the way in which, as a result of newspaper and radio reports, a protest in one center, for example Manila, soon aroused a response thousands of miles away in Berlin. This suggests the importance of withdrawing soldiers as speedily as possible from countries in which they are not essential, so that the expression of their grievances may not hamper our occupation of Germany and Japan. There are at the present moment some thousands of troops in France, China, India, the Philippines, Korea, the Pacific islands and other areas. In most of those places that are not under American political control—e.g. France and India—the maintenance of a handful of troops to care for the winding up of our obligations would seem adequate. In the Philippines and the Pacific islands, where we have an interest in military bases, no more than small forces should be required to maintain these interests. In Korea, which at present does not possess a government of its own and in which we have undertaken trusteeship responsibilities, troops will obviously be required until these obligations have been met.

**RECALLING MARINES FROM CHINA.** The question of China falls into a separate category because the maintenance of some 50,000 Marines in the north and roughly 10,000 Army men elsewhere has been explained officially on the ground that they are needed to disarm and evacuate the defeated Japanese armies. It has been apparent, however, that the Marines played a political role last fall in enabling the Chungking government to reestablish its authority in areas that would otherwise have been closed to it by the Chinese Communists. Although for a time the danger existed that American troops would become actively involved in a Chinese civil war, their position has become less precarious since the dispatch of General Marshall to China and the enunciation of a policy somewhat different from that carried out by former Ambassador Hurley. And today, as a result of the cease-fire order agreed to by the Central government and the Chinese Communists on January 10, North China seems likely to enter a period of relative quiet, while fundamental discussions take place in Chungking.

Since there are more than enough Chinese troops in North China to receive and enforce the Japanese surrender in that region, the presence of large forces of Marines seems unnecessary. This is particularly true because, under the terms of the Chinese truce, a three-man military commission, consisting of one American, one representative of the Central government, and one Chinese Communist, is being set up in Peiping to take care of such questions as the disarmament of remaining Japanese forces. Moreover, the policy of conciliation linked with General Marshall's name should not require, and might even be impeded by, the maintenance of American divisions on Chinese soil.

There are some Americans who fear that the withdrawal of troops from foreign areas would be synonymous with the abandonment of American responsibilities in world affairs. This would certainly be true in the case of Germany and Japan, but it would be unfortunate if we should come to regard armed force as a leading instrument of long-term policy in Allied areas. On the contrary, general experience shows that the presence of foreign troops is resented even by close allies and is frequently productive of bad feeling between the home population and the foreign forces. It might well be argued, for example, that the effectiveness of American policy toward France could only benefit from the withdrawal of our troops, in view of the many instances of friction between them and the French people.

The determination of the exact number of troops to be maintained in a particular area, the rate of withdrawal, and other technical matters cannot be made without full possession of the details affecting each area. But since the over-all decisions are political rather than military, a restatement of government policy on demobilization would seem to involve the following: (1) a clear-cut declaration that the United States intends to occupy Germany and Japan as long as necessary, with an explanation of the reasons for this position; (2) a pledge of early and rapid withdrawal of all, or the main body of, our troops from various other areas, with the exception of Korea; and (3) the alteration of demobilization practices, so that the bulk of soldiers and civilians will feel that a fair and consistent course is being followed in determining occupation personnel. Such a policy would bring thousands of soldiers home and speed to completion the immediate post-war task of demobilization which the armed forces have been carrying out for some months. At the same time it would constitute a guarantee to our Allies that we recognize the job that remains to be done in Germany and Japan and mean to see it through.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

## THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

*The Four Cornerstones of Peace*, by Vera Micheles Dean. New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1946. \$2.50

Lucid analysis of the things readers want to know concerning Dumbarton Oaks, Chapultepec, Yalta, and San Francisco accomplishments. Includes texts of the agreements.

*The Challenge of Red China*, by Gunther Stein. New York, Whittlesey House, 1945. \$3.50

A well-written, highly informative report on the Communist areas in China by a skilled economist and journalist, who visited the Northwest. He concludes that the Communists' "fundamental strength lies not so much in territory, arms, and outside supplies as in the fact that the New Democracy answers the needs of the Chinese people and solves their basic problems."

*Japan and the Son of Heaven*, by Willard Price. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945. \$2.75

In this discussion of the problem of the Japanese Emperor, as well as the social system linked with imperial Japan in the past, Mr. Price argues that a genuinely democratic government is possible in Japan, but that the Emperor institution must give way to a republic.

*Map of Korea, 1945*. Issued by Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C., 1945. \$2.00

A collection of maps with place names in romanized Korean. Should prove particularly valuable now that the Japanese names found on most maps of Korea are no longer in use.

*The Jewish Dilemma*, by Elmer Berger. New York, Devin-Adair, 1945. \$3.00

Rabbi Berger explains his belief that people of Jewish faith should be able to live free lives in their own nations instead of seeking a National Homeland in Palestine.

*United Nations Primer*, by Sigrid Arne. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1945. \$1.25

Simplified explanation of fifteen meetings which laid foundations for a world peace; includes documents.

*Journey Underground*, by David G. Prosser. New York, Dutton, 1945. \$2.75

A young Flight Officer tells the vivid story of his experiences after being forced down in occupied France.

*The German Record*, by William Ebenstein. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1945. \$3.00

Predicts no immediate democratic development in a defeated Germany, making the statement that Germany and Japan are the only major countries of the world which have never had successful democratic revolutions.

*A Nation of Nations*, by Louis Adamic. New York, Harper, 1945. \$3.50

Supporting his thesis that American history has taught "the Anglo-Saxon myth," Adamic piles up masses of interesting information about the part played by people from every section of the world in building the country.

*Italy and the Coming World*, by Don Luigi Sturzo. New York, Roy Publishers, 1945. \$3.50

A patriotic version of his country's past and its future prospects by a distinguished Italian exile. He appeals for an Italian republic with a progressive social and economic policy resting on the moral basis of a Christian democracy.

*Dilemma in Japan*, by Andrew Roth. Boston, Little, Brown, 1945. \$2.50

A vigorous, penetrating survey of the issues involved in dealing with a defeated Japan. The author particularly stresses the need for economic reforms, if Japan is to develop a peaceful society.

*Woodrow Wilson and the People*, by H. C. F. Bell. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1945. \$3.00

Rather distinctive in the mass of Wilson biographies because it represents the author's attempt to do the sort of book that Wilson would have felt would make all kinds of people understand him.

*A Catholic Looks at the World*, by Francis E. McMahon. New York, Vanguard Press, 1945. \$2.75

Presents the point of view of a well-known layman on many important issues of the present day.

*Brazil: An Interpretation*, by Gilberto Freyre. New York, Knopf, 1945. \$2.00

In this collection of lectures, the Brazilian sociologist's penetrating analysis of the ethnic and social climate of his country is for the first time made available to American readers. A chapter on foreign policy is included which should be required reading for students of the Good Neighbor Policy.

*Brazil on the March—A Study in International Cooperation*, by Morris Llewelyn Cooke. New York, Whittlesey House, 1944. \$3.00

The Chief of the American Technical Mission to Brazil (1943) advocates, as being mutually advantageous, close United States cooperation with an industrializing Brazil.

*The Cossacks*, by Maurice Hindus. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1945. \$3.00

Out of his love for Russia, Hindus has written a fascinating story of the famous warrior group, tying it up to present-day developments.

*Soldier of Democracy*, by Kenneth S. Davis. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1945. \$3.50

To be a biographer of a living celebrity is hard, but the author has done a creditable piece of work in sketching Eisenhower's background, personality and war service.

*Cooperative Communities at Work*, by Henrik F. Infield. New York, Dryden Press, 1945. \$3.00

Summarizes the history and workings of some of the most noted examples both in the United States and other countries, including the Mexican Ejido and the Russian Kolkhoz.

*Armament and History*, by John F. C. Fuller. New York, Scribners, 1945. \$2.50


An authoritative writer on things military, Mr. Fuller in this small book encompasses war's history from the stone age to today's atomic bomb. The thesis he develops is that the restriction of war is a pathological problem, and that to know the influence of armament may be of some value in treating that problem.

*Inside Rome with the Germans*, by Jane Scrivener. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$2.50

The pseudonymous diary of an American who saw many interesting things in the course of her work at the Vatican, where she was collecting and sending news of prisoners of war to their relatives.



# Washington News Letter



## WILL U.S. PARTY RIVALRY IMPAIR UNO's EFFECTIVENESS?

When the United Nations Organization moves to this country permanently in the spring, primary elections for the Congressional campaign of 1946 will already have begun. Party rivalry in those elections will affect United States policy in the United Nations Organization. Republicans, hopeful that the elections will give them a majority in the House or Senate, or perhaps in both, for the first time in 16 years, already are attempting to put their stamp on foreign policy in order to weaken Democratic efforts to take all the credit for it. Arthur Vandenberg, Senator from Michigan and a delegate to the United Nations Organization, disclosed that Republican objective when, on landing in England on January 6 to attend the first General Assembly of the UNO, he announced that he could not accept the agreement on atomic energy reached at Moscow in December.

**SOURCES OF AMERICAN POLICY.** One problem confronting President Truman is to see to it that the approach of elections in this country does not immobilize the United Nations as in the past it has so often immobilized the Federal government, whose officials customarily fear boldness, candor and even action at such a time. Unless some system is devised that enables Congress and the minority party to share openly each step of the way in the evolution of foreign policy, disagreement crippling to both the United States and the UNO will continue to arise at critical moments. Truman, who knew Vandenberg well when they both were Senators, is said to be confident that the latter wants to further the United Nations Organization, not disrupt it, so long as the Administration takes into account his point of view on specific details. The minority party inevitably has a potent weapon in its ability to embarrass the Administration by blocking its program in Congress.

Nobody in Washington has proposed a method that will enable Congress to share directly in the making of foreign policy and at the same time prevent it from exercising a sort of veto over the decisions of the UNO. Until the dilemma is resolved, the United Nations Organization will be restrained by uncertainty over the ultimate attitude of this country on each major question. Secretary Byrnes acknowledged the veto power of Congress on January 7, when he announced that it will have the final say on American acceptance or rejection of the Moscow atomic agreement, which deals with the most acute issue now affecting international relations.

The attitude Congress displays toward the atomic agreement will disclose whether this country, with

its political system of checks and balances, can take part constructively in any international body through representatives chosen by the President. At the same time, Congress can exert a good influence on the deliberations of the UNO if it discourages the international organization from conducting its business in excessive secrecy. Congressional examination of the Moscow accord could be valuable if it clarified the true nature of the agreement without insisting on changes unacceptable to other nations. The agreement paves the way for a prohibition against manufacture of the atomic bomb and, while it establishes no international system of industrial inspection that could determine whether United Nations members were honoring the prohibition, its signers assumed that the UNO will work out safeguarding controls.

**GOOD START FOR UNO.** Byrnes went to London hopeful that the United Nations would minimize the atomic issue during the opening session of the General Assembly, which, however, is to select the atomic commission proposed in the Moscow agreement. Looking forward to a long life for the United Nations Organization, Washington wants it to avoid certain issues at this time. To this end, the United States is enlisting the cooperation of Iran and Turkey, neither of which is expected to protest at this session of the General Assembly or at the first meeting of the Security Council against what they consider Russian aggression respecting Azerbaijan in Iran and threats against Kars in Turkey. The General Assembly will satisfy Byrnes thoroughly if it organizes the various constituent bodies of UNO and then adjourns until the second meeting, to be held in the United States.

The atomic agreement, which will be the first great problem of the United Nations, has a special value in that it makes it necessary for all the great powers to take a serious interest in the UNO. When Byrnes went to Moscow in December for conversations with Bevin and Molotov, he feared that in the absence of any agreement with Russia for international treatment of the atomic issue, the U.S.S.R. would give only perfunctory recognition to the General Assembly meeting and designate Ambassador Gusev, already in London, as chief of the Russian delegation. The designation after the Moscow meeting of Vice Foreign Commissar Andrei Y. Vishinsky revealed that the Russians intended to cooperate, for Molotov in the past has intrusted to Vishinsky many assignments of first importance to Russia in foreign affairs.

BLAIR BOLLES